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  • Logical positivism and realism

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    Definitions

    Logical positivism─a twentieth century empiricist position embracing some form of the verification principle (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999).

    Verification principle─the view that a proposition can be true either by definition, or by empirical verification (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999).

    Empiricism─the view that experience has primacy in human knowledge and justified belief (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999).

    Empirical─derived from or guided by experience or experiment (The Macquarie Dictionary 1991). 

    Analytic proposition─a proposition that is true by definition, or logically necessary as in 'all trianges have three sides' (Miller, 1993).

    Sythetic proposition─a proposition that is not logically necessary, the predicate adding something to the subject (Miller, 1993).

    Predicate─in grammar, the part of a sentence that attributes a property to the subject; in philosophy, by extension, a property or attribute of something (Miller, 1993).

    Deduction─the process of drawing a conclusion from something known or assumed (Macquarie dictionary, 1991).

    Induction─the process of discovering explanations from a particular set of facts, by estimating the weight of observational evidence in favour of a propostion which usually asserts something about that entire class of facts (Macquarie dictionary, 1991).

    Praxis─practice as opposed to theory (Macquarie dictionary, 1991).

    Contingent─dependent for existence, occurrence, character, etc., on something not yet certain; conditional upon (Macquarie dictionary, 1991). 

    Abductive reasoning─reasoning for the discovery, as opposed to the justification (verification or confirmation), of scientific hypotheses or theories (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999).

    Scientific realism─the view that the subject matter of scientific research and scientific theory exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that the goal of scientific research is to describe and explain both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. Scientific realism holds that there are knowable, mind-independent facts, objects, or properties (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999).

    Critical realism─like scientific realism, except it raises its claims within the social sciences (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999).

    Relativism─the rejection of the view that there are universal truths about the world based on its essential characteristics. There are only interpretations of the world.   

    Introduction

    In the twentieth century, the positivism of the classical social theorists Marx and Durkheim was further articulated by the logical positivists, becoming philosophically distinct in the process. Over a thirty year period of thought in the first half of the twentieth century a group of philosophers set out a range of methodological precepts that aimed to guide a scientific study of society. These precepts of logical positivism were then challenged by post positivist thinkers within the philosophy of science, leading to important philosophical adaptations in social science. In this topic we will look at logical positivism, the post positivist critiques of Kuhn, Feyerabend and Quine, and the philosophical adaptations these critiques led to in the form of pragmatism. Finally, we will consider realist replies to pragmatism within the social sciences. 

    Before moving on, it is worth making a few points about the definition of the terms positivism, logical positivism and realism. These terms are often used interchangeably, or are used to refer to approaches generally associated with a 'scientific method', including naturalism, behaviourism or empiricism. There are however important distinctions to be made among them. In this topic and this series of web resources we will use the philosophical definitions of terms. The term positivism is used to refer to the work of the classical social theorists Marx and Durkheim. Logical positivism will be used to refer to its articulation within twentieth century philosophy of science.

    Where positivists aimed to theorise about non-observable social laws by extrapolating from observable data, logical positivists wrote about the problem that we can only know what we can directly observe. Logical positivism offered a range of principles to ensure that social science knowledge is based on a 'neutral observation language' directly tied to observable evidence. 

    Critiques of this position within the philosophy of science led to pragmatism which rejects logical positivism's assumption that it is, at least in principle, possible to arrive at knowledge of an objective reality via direct observation and a language stripped of cultural and theoretical inference. For pragmatists, we must cling to strictly observable evidence, but accept at the same time that knowledge will inevitability be coloured by language, theory and culture.

    Realism, which is discussed briefly towards the end of this topic, is philosophically different from both pragmatism and logical positivism. Realism is the view that there are mind independent social structures or processes that it is the job of social science to explain. Realist researchers attempt to build theories that explain these underlying realities based on social facts.

     Logical positivism

    Summary taken from Hughes, J and W. Sharrock. 1997. The philosophy of social research. Pearson Longman, London, and The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy.

    In the 1920s in Vienna and later, a group of thinkers, including Otto Neurath (1882–1945), Ernst Mach (1838–1916), Maruitz Schlick (1882–1936), Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–76), and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), attempted to articulate a twentieth century version of positivist scientific principles within the philosophy of science, including consideration of how scientific knowledge of the social world could be gained. These thinkers wanted to bed down an approach that could ensure that the knowledge produced by social science was purged of theoretical preconception, emotion, ideology or other bias. In doing so they were concerned to avoid a number of difficulties they saw in achieving an objective observation of social and human phenomenon. These precepts and the difficulties they sought to overcome are outlined below.

    The logical positivists offered the following four inter-linked principles for a positivistic science:

    1. An ‘observation language’ ─ the observation language must be capable of being matched with observed phenomenon in a direct manner.
    This aimed to enable the scientist to avoid generating data that reflects pregiven theory, judgement, interpretation or other subjective mental operation. In the same way that scientists observe and classify natural phenomena based on observable evidence (for example, size, shape, motion), social scientists must, according to logical positivists, also generate a precise scientific language tied to observable phenomenon. As long as theory is appropriately described in a neutral observation language, it was reasoned, social scientists could check the truthfulness of their statements in the only way possible, against direct evidence from the senses. 

    2. Only two kinds of proposition can be recognised: analytic and synthetic. Analytic statements are true by definition (2 + 2 = 4). Synthetic propositions are true when they correspond to facts in the observable world.
    This precept was to allow social science disciplines, at least in principle, to be grounded in and to develop as purely empirical bodies of knowledge, whose central propositions could be verified either by definition or by observable evidence. The discipline could then claim to avoid, or at least aspire to avoid any statements based in theoretical preconception, ideology, or prejudice. For many logical positivists, the assumption underpinning this principle is that ideas about how the world works are comprised of simpler ideas which are traceable to elements of direct experience which can be expressed as statements.

    In fact, the logical positivists saw many problems in achieving this ideal. Many could see that statements or terms within science do not refer to observables (for example atom, absolute vacuum), and scientists do much more than simply assemble statements and facts. Scientists also look at the relationships between facts and statments and build theories about the world which are not themselves directly observable (for example Darwin's theory of evolution).

    3. Human mental states can be inferred through outward bodily, observable displays, or can be captured via well designed questionnaires, attitude scales or interviews.
    This precept was designed to overcome the difficulty of capturing non-observable, internal mental phenomenon that are important in social research, and of depending on introspective subjective accounts that do not reflect facts in order to do so (for instance, people may not report racist feelings, but behave in racist ways). By observing outward behaviour, logical positivism aimed to get an objective understanding of mental states. Similarly, well constructed questionnaires, attitude scales or interviews are often designed to capture responses that indicate a person's values (for example by asking the same question in different was to enable cross checking).

    4. Concepts (for example 'class') must be thought in terms of their observable manifestation (for example income) or 'indicators'. Relationships between observables or indicators can then be tracked to build theory.
    This aimed to avoid the problem that many social science concepts cannot be observed, recorded or measured directly (for example class, prejudice, capitalism, power, authority). There was also the problem that different studies could define a non-observable concept against different indicators, making it difficult to draw any general conclusions about the results being generated within a field of study. In order to avoid this, the logical positivists argued that researchers within a field of study should identify and agree upon the observable indicators of a given shared object of study to ensure comparability of results.

    According to the principles of the logical positivists, statements about causal laws, general theories or explanations about deeper underlying phenomenon can only ever be offered as probabilities, since new evidence might always be found to refute a given theory. The radical empiricist David Hume argued further, and, for logical positivists, persuasively, that because causal connections between phenomena are not themselves directly observable they cannot be claimed to reflect a necessary condition of the world, but simply a habit of thought that is projected onto nature. In other words, the idea that X causes Y is really just an idea, it cannot actually be observed by the senses, so we cannot know that a causal relationship exists objectively. All that we can say for sure, based on our perception, is that there may be a temporal succession and spatial proximity of perceived phenomenon. For this reason, the logical positivists would typically only recognise deduction (and induction only reluctantly) as a legitimate mode of reasoning.

    Far from being sure of their philosophy in every detail, the logical positivists were marked by continued debate and uncertainty. Their key problem turned around the possibility of making general claims about underlying social phenomenon based on immediately observable evidence. Indeed, if held to the letter of their methodological principles, the descriptions offered by logical positivism can end by reflecting more about the measurements and techniques used to define indicators than they do underlying human or social phenomenon (for example, ‘intelligence’ becomes that which intelligence tests measure).

    Within the world of practical research many have found the idea of scientific certainty of the kind propounded by JS Mill (1806–73) attractive. Mill's conception of reality has become a kind of addendum to logical positivism within much everyday contemporary research. Mill saw the possibility of extrapolating certainty and generalisation from empirical data based on the idea that nature is comprised of causal laws awaiting discovery by empirical science. When brought together with logical positivism, this provided a philosophical rationale for an empirical science that built theoretical generalisation, claiming truth status, offering predictive forecasts, and making authoritative recommendations based on knowledge claims about an underpinning natural world of uniform, cause and effect inter-relationships. In contrast to logical positivism, which is open to the criticism of being able to offer only inconsequential conclusions about underlying social processes, a science read through Mill brings the danger of a science whose claims about its ability to explain reality are overblown and perhaps not subject to continual testing against emerging empirical evidence.

    In the last half of the twentieth century logical positivism came under considerable attack. Below we will review some arguments made within the philosophy of science against both logical positivism, and against the kind of science that emerged from a logical positivism read through Mill’s conception of reality.

    Post positivist challenges

    Summary taken from Hughes, J and W. Sharrock. 1997. The philosophy of social research. Pearson Longman, London, and von Wright, G 1993, ‘Two traditions’, in Social research: Philosophy, politics and practice, edited by M Hammersley, Sage, London, and the Cambridge dictionary of philosophy.

    Popper and the hypothetico-deductive model

    Popper was concerned with the problem that inductivism cannot justify theoretical generalisation. Popper (1902–94):

    • opposed the verification principle of logical positivism, arguing that a proposition cannot be demonstrated to be true by empirical verification because it is not possible to take an infinite number of observations, and only one contrary piece of evidence disproves a theoretical statement;
    • sought to characterise science by its method, and specifically the practice of falsification instead;
    • argued that successful science (which contributes to knowledge) grows not by ammassing supporting evidence, but by posing tentative solutions or conjectures to problems and eliminating errors by vigorous testing and the refutation of conjectures that fail;
    • argued that criticism should be the hallmark of rationality, rather than an insistence on proof, confirmation and positive argument.

    Popper supported a hypothetico-deductive model of science which ensures the need for constant scientific testing of conjectures. The hypothetico-deductive model proceeds by positing a hypothesis based on imagination, expectation or guesswork which can then be tested, and potentially falsified. If the test falsifies the theory it is refuted. If the test does not falsify the theory it is taken as corroborative. In this view, only those theories which have withstood rigorous and repetitive testing can claim a high probability to provide certain knowledge about the world. 

    Kuhn and the sociology of science

    Thomas Kuhn (1922–96) offers a radical challenge to both logical positivism and to Popper's view of scientific progress. For Kuhn: 

    1. revolutions in scientific thinking are not based on cumulative, gradual knowledge acquisition and testing;
    2. science is a social institution and scientists are socialised to accept the reigning values, beliefs, concepts, and rules of order and technique; 
    3. new paradigms cut across the terms of the old, offering new concepts, questions, language, data, and new ways of seeing things (termed theoretical incommensurability);
    4. paradigms cannot therefore be compared within the same terms;
    5. acceptance of scientific theory is often based on political and cultural factors, rather than observable evidence.

    Kuhn undermines the status of science as a rational and progressive development towards truth. According to Kuhn, shifts in scientific 'paradigms' (or disciplinary matrixes or exemplars) reflect the distribution of power, professional ambition, wider political and cultural factors, and the limits of existing theoretical paradigms. For Kuhn, theory enables a particular perception of reality, and reality opens itself to a variety of possible theorisations, none of which perfectly corresponds to the facts. Kuhn's work gave rise to a sociology of science which attempts to explain why some knowledge and beliefs come to be held as true while others do not.

    Feyerabend and science as myth

    Despite his critique of scientific generalisation and scientific progress, Kuhn did not question the progressive nature of science per se. Kuhn did not dispute that science has progressed human knowledge, but the idea that it does so in a linear fashion, or in a way that is unrelated to social and historical conditions. Nevertheless Kuhn's ideas do raise the relativist doubt that all knowledge is ultimately relative to its social context. Paul Feyerabend argued (1924–94) that scientific change or 'progress' is simply a movement from one myth to another. Feyerabend:

    1. offers an argument against the view that a distinction can be made between observation and theory;
    2. argues that all observations are theory-laden, that is, told through the lens of cultural, linguistic and perceptual filters;
    3. since no neutral empirical evidence can be found to support a given theory, one theory is as good as another–at least in so far as its relationship to evidence is concerned;
    4. theories are chosen not on the basis of empirical confirmation, but idiosyncratic and social factors;
    5. it is not possible to differentiate the products of science from non-scientific entities like myths.

    Feyerabend argues that there is no scientific knowledge that can be said to be the product of objective reason or empirical fact. All knowledge is conditioned by factors such as self-interest, ideology and culture.

    Feyerabend's critique opens a number of uncomfortable questions, one of which is clearly about science itself. If all knowledge is theory-laden, or 'biased', should we then abandon science? 

    Pragmatism

    One philosophical development arising from the post positivist critiques was pragmatism. Willard Van Orman Quine's (1908–2000) rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction was a key stone in the development of pragmatism, a philosophic movement first formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) in the 1870s, and later elaborated by John Dewey (1859–1952), George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) and Jane Addams (1860–1935).

    Quine and pragmatic science

    According to Quine:

    1. Kuhn and Feyerabend are right about the contingency of knowledge;
    2. it is not possible to obtain certain knowledge, or knowledge that is independent of theory;
    3. what we perceive reflects what our concepts and theories posit;
    4. we should forget about trying to find principles that can guarantee certain knowledge (like the verification principle of logical positivism or the falsification principle of Popper);
    5. we cannot ensure that scientific statements refer to direct experience (as for logical positivism, Popper) because scientific statements are part of larger networks of statements and theories which inform our perceptions, and while some are tied to direct experience, others are not, such that our experience is always coloured by the overall concept or theory;
    6. even sentences tied to direct experience are revisable when theory or concepts change;
    7. meaning and facts are not separable, they are intertwined within the structure of statements, so for example, even if we see a black swan we may not revise the statement 'all swans are white' because we might not recognise the 'swan' as a swan;
    8. science is not equivalent to myth however (as Feyerabend says), science is the best source of knowledge we have about what exists;
    9. there is a material world of things which have real effects, and this is what science studies;
    10. instead of trying to find a philosophy to support science, science should inform philosophy, because philosophy is ultimately about what kinds of things there are;
    11. science can and does get it wrong, and must be continually questioned and revised.

    According to pragmatism:

    From Cambridge dictionary of philosophy. Second edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 730.

    1. knowledge is guided by interests or values (when intelligently ordered the world is organised to achieve certain ends which are thought to be desirable);
    2. the first point of reflection must then be direct action or praxis;
    3. theory and practice are not separate, theory is an abstraction based on experience which provides for directed action, theory is an integral part of intelligent practice;
    4. knowledge is instrumental, a tool for organising experience satisfactorily;
    5. concepts are habits of belief or rules of action;
    6. values are culturally and historically contingent, and are useful as a guide to decision making to the extent that they satisfactorily resolve problems as determined by those affected or likely to be affected.
    7. the value of life as growth is an ultimate principle for decision making;
    8. when order prevails, conditions reflect their deliberate transformation according to intentional and desired ends;
    9. truths (knowledge, concepts, theories) are beliefs justified through experience, and are therefore fallible;
    10. knowledge can only by confirmed through repetitive experiment and inquiry.

    Instead of aiming to understand the world through a language of observation beyond values and theory, as for the logical positivists, pragmatism can give rise to a search for truth about the ways in which the world is understood, reflecting upon the motivations influencing ethical systems, individual and social values, and the situations within which they occur. Decision making growing out of science is then not based for pragmatists from the facts emerging from an objective science, but from the ultimate value of life as growth, and therefore against the effects of actual or projected outcomes upon persons. Pragmatism holds much in common with social constructionism which will be explained in the next topic.

    Pragmatist research design

    From Morgan, D. L. (2007) ‘Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods’, Journal of mixed methods research. Vol. 1, No. 1. Pp. 48-76.

    Pragmatist research design:

    • is abductive─working back and forth between theory and practice, converting observations into theory, and testing theories against action;
    • emphasises behaviour, beliefs behind behaviour, and consequences likely to arise from different behaviour;
    • emphasises shared meaning and joint action between people, and between research fields in setting research agendas;
    • wants to know the extent to which shared understanding can be achieved, and what actions are made possible by these shared understandings.

    Conclusion

    The post positivists Kuhn, Feyerabend and Quine hold that knowledge is inevitably shaped by:

    • the researcher’s motivations and values,
    • politics and power relations, 
    • cultural values and meanings,
    • existing scientific theory,
    • language.

    Pragmatism gives rise to a perspective in which science, although our best bet for understanding the world, cannot claim to have access to more certain knowledge than other ways of knowing. Science becomes only as good as its instrumental uses.

    The realist positions below attempts to reinstate scientific claims to certain knowledge.

    Realism

    From Blaikie, N 1993, Approaches to social enquiry, Polity Press, Cambridge, pages 58-62, and Haig, B. 1995, Grounded theory as scientific method, web page, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearboo/95_docs/haig.html, viewed 27/10/2011.

    Unlike pragmatism which refuses to make a separation between experience and knowledge, realism argues it is possible, indeed, it is the job of science, to make this distinction. In other words, for realists, scientists must strive to separate out what is inherited cultural knowledge and subjective impressions from a real social world. Scientific realism is the view that the subject matter of science exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that the job of science is to describe and explain this real world. A range of thinkers in the philosophy of science are associated with scientific realism, including Hilary Putnam (b1926), Richard Boyd (b1942), Ian Hacking (b1936), Phillip Kitcher (b1947), William Newton-Smith (b1943) and J.D. Trout (b1959).

    In the social sciences, Roy Bhaskar (b1944) is well known for a critical realist position. Bhaskar's version of realism will be considered in more detail in the topic on Critical theory. At this point in our discussion of social theory, we will consider only some of the central tenets of the critical realist position. For Bhaskar:

    1. It is possible to describe and explain unobservable aspects of the world.
    2. Reality comprises three elements: the empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical pertains to what is observed. The actual pertains to events, whether or not they are observed. The real consists of the underlying structures or mechanisms that constitute and produce events.
    3. Real structures or mechanisms exist independently of our observations of them. They exist whether we observe them or not.
    4. Although not always observable in terms of their effects, these structures can generate observable events, or cause manifest phenomenon.
    5. The job of the critical realist is to explain social phenomenon by revealing the underlying structures and mechanisms that cause them.

    In the topic on Critical theory we will consider how critical realists attempt to get around the problem of subjective, theory-laden or ideologically driven observations of real social structures.

    Realism also:

    1. distinguishes itself from idealism, or the idea that the 'external world' or the world as we understand it reflects the workings of the mind;
    2. distinguishes itself from relativism, or the belief that there are no independent bases for judging the truth or accuracy of accounts;
    3. uses empirical evidence to theorise about non observable structural relations or generative processes;
    4. sees that real phenomena are characterised by relatively stable, recurrent, or general qualities and tendencies, as are their effects;
    5. aims to explain these, and not more ephemeral phenomena;
    6. given that these general qualities, tendencies and effects are not observable, points to the need for reliable data to be used as evidence for the existence of phenomena;
    7. sees theories as, at least in principle, capable of predicting future social or human phenomena and events.

    Realist grounded theory

    Grounded theory is associated with Barney Glaser (b 1930), Anselm Strauss (1916–96) and Juliet Corbin writing in the 1940s to the late 60s and early 70s. Since it was first propounded in The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), the method has been adapted within a range of philosophical approaches in the social sciences, most commonly interpretivism, but also hermeneutics. In its original formulation grounded theory reflected a realist set of philosophical propositions. It is this usage that is described below.

    For a realist grounded theorist, the hypothetico-deductive model is problematic because its suspicion of the possible psychological, sociological or historical bias within theory leads to a concern only with theory validation, and not with the origin or creation of theory. Given that many theories are under developed, this then leads to premature testing of theories. Realist grounded theorists argue that there is more to theory evaluation than simply testing, including the clarity, consistency, density, scope, integration, fit to data, explanatory power, predictiveness and application of theory.

    Grounded theory in its realist formulation: 

    1. is an explanatory mode of research that seeks to generate abstract theoretical explanations about real social processes which have predictive, explanatory value;
    2. rejects adherence to theory as the departure point for research;
    3. seeks to exclude a priori theory, or other bias;
    4. uses an inductive approach that builds theory from experience;
    5. categories should emerge from the data, not theory; 
    6. theory should reflect facts in the social world;
    7. draws upon scientific language and concepts;
    8. explains events and conditions that are problematic for those they affect─asks ‘what is happening here?’;
    9. uses qualitative methods (minimal use of mathematical techniques, counting limited to ‘how many?’, ‘how often?’, ‘to what degree?’);
    10. uses systematic approach to the collection and analysis of data;
    11. aims for the status of ‘good science’─veracity, generalisability, reliability;
    12. theory changes when new data emerges leading to qualifications of the theory.

    NB: Grounded theory texts sometimes advise researchers to postpone the literature review until after the data has been collected. Grounded theory seeks to provide fresh perspectives, especially on areas of social life that have previously been explained with insufficient attention to experiential evidence. In order to be true to the spirit of grounded theory one should try to avoid simply reproducing tired old theoretical concepts within descriptions of social processes. However, it is still necessary to know the literature well enough to ensure that you are not simply reproducing the same conclusions on the topic already in the field.

    Grounded theory method:

    1. Data collection, coding and analysis occur simultaneously.
    2. Data collection is shaped by the emerging theory.
    3. Coding is the central means by which raw data is converted into theory.
    4. The coding process involves constantly comparing coded data with other coded data to check the fit of the categories.
    5. Substantive codes that conceptualise the empirical substance of the research are generated first.
    6. Theoretical codes are then generated that conceptualise how the substantive codes relate to each other as hypotheses within the theory.
    7. Both substantive and theoretical codes are then subsumed under a small number of core categories that have maximum explanatory power.
    8. The method looks primarily to define ‘basic social processes’ which are ‘staged, patterned, pervasive and fundamental social processes in the research domain which enable maximum explanatory grip to be obtained on the data' (Glasser 1978:93).
    9. The basic social process can be located by defining what resolves the main concern of the subjects studied.
    10. To locate the ‘basic social process’, the researcher asks ‘what is the main concern or problem of these people?’ and ‘what accounts for variation around ways of dealing with the problem?’
    11. May ask participants to confirm or refute theory.

    Grounded theory is not simply about presenting findings, a set of themes, or a description of a phenomenon. It aims to produce a systematic, explanatory theory founded in concepts that emerge from the data. It is a time consuming, painstaking process that involves immersion in the data (Corbin and Holt, 2005).

    Realism shares with logical positivism and the hypothetico-deductive model a faith in a real or objective world that exists out there independently of cultural and historical perspective. The difference of emphasis between them is only about how knowledge about reality can be verified. Realism is a more inductive approach that attempts to generalise directly from data without theoretical interference. Logical positivism and the hypothetico-deductive model are empiricist, leading to a science that is more deductive in orientation, emphasising the need to justify or test theory against observable data, and dealing more in the language of probability than certainty. This more deductive model can be witnessed in research projects that build hypotheses upon well established theory, or which pose hypotheses for testing against observed facts.

    Conclusion

    Scientific aspirations within the social sciences have frequently turned to philosophy to justify their methodological approaches. Logical positivism and the hypothetico-deductive model which accept only knowledge about reality that comes to us through direct observation prefer to delimit their claims as strictly as possible to immediate empirical evidence, and to support only those theories that have been rigorously tested against empirical evidence. For logical positivists it was, at least in principle, possible to know the world independently of subjective inference, as long as scientists carefully limited their statements to synthetic and analytic propositions conveyed within a neutral observation language. The logical positivists wanted to theorise about underlying social phenomenon without at the same time conjuring unobservable phenomena, and thereby contradicting their own premises for a viable social theory. The philosophy of J.S. Mill and the hypothetico-deductive model was seen by many as offering a solution to the difficulties of achieving this because it enabled scientists to posit theories for the purposes of ongoing testing.

    The critiques of Kuhn and Feyerabend sought to undermine the logical positivist faith in a ‘neutral observation language’ and theories comprised of synthetic and analytic statements, leading to reflection on the inevitability of the historical and cultural contingency of scientific knowledge. This led ultimately to scientific pragmatism and a rejection of the possibility of a science based on certain truth, as well as greater emphasis on the contingency and uses of scientific knowledge within specific social contexts.

    Realists, not happy with the relativist universe we seem to find ourselves in within a pragmatic world view, then seek to reassert the capacity of science to theorise about a real social world independent of experience. For realists, social scientists can and should attempt to theorise about the world independent of subjective inference. Realism then represents an attempt to return science to more certain philosophical foundations. Realist approaches in the social sciences attempt to explain real social conditions and processes, often eschewing theory as a departure point in doing so.

    References used in the development of this resource

    Blaikie, N 1993, Approaches to social enquiry, Polity Press, Cambridge, pages 58-62.

    Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition, 1999. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Crotty, M 1998, The Foundations of social research, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.

    Hughes, J and Sharrock, W 1997, The Philosophy of social research, Third Edition, Pearson Longman, London.

    Morgan, D. L. 2007, ‘Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods’, Journal of mixed methods research. Vol. 1, No. 1., pp. 48-76.

    Miller, E 1993, Questions that matter: An invitation to philosophy, shorter edition, McGraw-Hill Inc, New York.

    This web resource was developed by Wendy Bastalich.


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