

6

Educational Action Research: A Critical Approach

Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis

In advocating 'emancipatory action research' and in construing this as a form of 'critical educational science', our (1986) book *Becoming Critical* has often been viewed by the action research community as offering a 'political' approach to action research as opposed to those other methodological perspectives which focus more on the 'personal' and 'professional' development of educational practitioners. In this chapter, we will take the opportunity to expose and challenge a key assumption underlying this way of understanding emancipatory action research: the assumption that it is either possible or desirable for educational action research to be anything other than 'political'. In doing this, we will argue that education cannot be extracted from politics for the simple reason that, to paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum about diplomacy and war (2004), education is politics conducted by other means. In elaborating and defending this argument, we will explore what we mean by 'political' first in relation to 'education' and then in relation to 'educational action'. We will then try to show how, construed as a form of critical educational science, emancipatory action research is 'political' in the sense that it is constituted by and constitutive of the values and principles of the democratic form of social life it seeks to foster and achieve. Finally, we will try to expose the weaknesses of any attempt to classify different forms of educational action research by distinguishing those focusing on 'personal' and 'professional' development from those offering a 'political' approach.

WHAT IS EDUCATION?

Any view of educational action research presupposes views of 'education', 'action' and 'research'. In *Becoming Critical*, we adopted the relatively uncontroversial

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

view that 'education' can only be adequately understood as an intrinsic part of the general process of social reproduction: the social process by which each new generation is initiated into the language, rituals, roles, relationships and routines which its members have to learn in order to become members of a society. At one time, this process of enculturation was not differentiated from the general process of childrearing through which the young would learn what they needed to know and understand in an informal and unstructured way. But as the significance and complexity of this process for the maintenance and continuity of society became more apparent, so it gradually became more formally recognized and more culturally defined. There therefore developed a range of distinctive *social practices* ('teaching', 'lecturing', 'tutoring'), distinctive *social roles* ('teacher', 'lecturer', 'tutor') and distinctive *social institutions* ('academy', 'university', 'school', 'college') all concerned with the pursuit of the human activity we now call 'education'. Walter Feinberg (1983: 155) outlined this way of understanding 'education' in these words:

> To speak of education as social reproduction is to recognize its primary role in maintaining intergenerational continuity and in maintaining the identity of a society across generations. … At the most basic level, the study of education involves an analysis of the process whereby a society reproduces itself over time such that it can be said of one generation that it belongs to the same society as did generations long past and generations not yet born.

The social identity of a society is rarely static or fixed. It is constantly evolving in response to changing historical circumstances and new cultural conditions. Although education has a necessary and conservative tendency to reproduce existing patterns of social life, it also serves a *transformative* function by equipping rising generations with the forms of consciousness and modes of social relationships necessary to participate in changed, and hopefully better, forms of social life. Neither the reproductive nor the transformative function of education is possible without the other: both are essential features of education in any society and there is always an unavoidable tension between the two.

The fact that education plays a major role in the process of social reproduction and transformation makes questions about the kind of society it should aspire to foster and promote unavoidable. To raise such questions is necessarily to raise political questions about the nature of the 'good society': questions about the kind of society that would best enable its members to live a satisfying and worthwhile form of life. It follows from this that it is always possible, and invariably desirable, to evaluate any educational policy or practice by evaluating the assumptions it makes about what constitutes 'the good society'. It also follows that the conventional demarcation lines drawn between 'education' and 'politics' are, to say the least, suspect. As Martin Hollis (1971: 153) put it:

> Education is a process of shaping society a generation hence. Whether that shape is well chosen is a question in public moral philosophy whose other name is political theory.

To recognize that the aims, forms and contents of education are an integral part of the general process through which a society's own definition of the 'good society'

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

is reproduced and transformed is not to regard these aims, forms and contents as passive responses to societal demands. It is simply to recognize that practical educational questions about what to teach and how to teach are always themselves a particular expression of more fundamental political questions about which existing patterns of social life ought to be reproduced or transformed. Conversely, it is also to recognize that political questions about how society ought to be changed and improved always give focus and direction to practical questions about the kind of education that a more desirable form of social life presupposes and requires. To recognize that the relationship between 'education' and 'society' is always reciprocal is also to recognize why educational questions and political questions are always indissolubly linked.

Because individuals and social groups with different views about the future shape of their society will have conflicting views about which aspects of education should be preserved and which need to be changed, educational policy and practice is always the subject of intense processes of *contestation* engendered by the diverse range of values and interests that exist in any society. It is precisely because 'education' is always the subject of this process of contestation that it is intrinsically 'political'. Since 'politics' may, in Harold Laswell's famous (1936) phrase, be defined as 'being about who gets what, when, how', educational questions (not only about the aims, forms and content of education, but also about who should answer these questions) are always part of a wider political debate between those holding different views about the nature of the 'good society'.

Different views about the nature of the 'good society' always reflect different political ideologies – that is, the historically sedimented forms of consciousness through which individuals acquire their understanding of social life, including their beliefs about the relationship between education and society. It is for this reason that the kind of education dominant in a society at any one time can always be understood as the product of past political struggles through which the relationship between education and society has continually been modified and transformed. Insofar as these political struggles have shaped the process of contestation through which education is formed, contemporary education is – like contemporary society itself – always a product of history.

WHAT IS EDUCATIONAL ACTION?

Given this understanding of the role of education in the contested process of social reproduction and transformation, it should be obvious why, in *Becoming Critical*, we rejected those 'technical' forms of *educational* action research that construed 'educational action' as a form of politically neutral action that serves as an instrumental 'means' to some externally determined political 'end'. Instead, we took the view that the 'educational action' buried in the term 'educational action research' can be more appropriately understood as a species of those distinctive human practices that Aristotle (2003) termed *praxis*: ethically informed

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

practices in which and through which some understanding of the individual good and the good society are given practical expression. This is not to say that an educational practice is explicitly based on some theoretically vindicated political theory about the nature of 'the good life' or 'the good society'. It is simply to make the point that to act educationally is always to act on the basis of an ethical disposition to practise in accordance with some more or less tacit understanding of what constitutes 'the good life' and 'the good society'.

Aristotle called this ethical disposition *phronēsis* – which we would today translate as practical wisdom. It is revealed by educational practitioners who, in striving to achieve the 'good' view of the 'good society' intrinsic to their practice, demonstrate a capacity to see the particularities of their concrete practical situation in the light of its general educational significance and, on this basis, to make an educationally principled decision about the most appropriate action to take. But *phronēsis* is not something that can first be learned 'in theory' and then applied 'in practice'. It can only be acquired by a process of initiating novice practitioners into a largely unarticulated and usually tacit body of practical knowledge and understanding endemic to the particular social context within which educational practices are conducted. Of course, the body of practical knowledge and understanding circulating in a community of educational practitioners at any given time and within any given culture is not simply 'given'. It is always constituted by, and constitutive of, those historically bequeathed traditions of educational thought and action within which practitioners' understandings of the good of their practice develop and evolve. In other words, the 'educational action' which educational action research aspires to develop and improve has a history and it is only possible to develop or improve understanding of this action by first acknowledging the historical traditions through which this practice develops and evolves and through which any understanding of the role of education in promoting the 'good society' has been reproduced and transformed over time. Understood as a species of *praxis*, 'educational action' is thus a form of political action aimed at realizing the view of the good society to which the educational practitioner is tacitly committed.

WHAT IS EDUCATIONAL ACTION RESEARCH?

What does it mean to describe the kind of emancipatory educational action research advocated in *Becoming Critical* as 'political'? On the one hand, it may mean that it offers a view of action research that is politically partisan or doctrinaire, implying that other views of action research are somehow apolitical or non-political. On the other hand, describing it as 'political' might mean that it self-consciously promotes a particular view of the good society. The kind of emancipatory action research we advocated in *Becoming Critical* embodies the latter understanding in that it is a form of educational research that embodies a view of the good society as a democratic society committed to extending opportunities

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

for all citizens collectively to shape the future of their society by engaging in what Amy Gutmann (1987: 39) calls 'conscious social reproduction'. Understood in this way, what distinguishes emancipatory action research from other forms of action research is the recognition that there is no single vision of the 'good society' that can be put beyond rational dispute and hence that the arguments, disagreements and processes of contestation to which such disputes give rise should not be concealed or repressed. Emancipatory action research is not 'political' because it dogmatically espouses a fixed image of the 'good society' but because it seeks to provide the conditions that make processes of contestation through which debates about 'the good society' are conducted rational and democratic: 'rational' in the sense that such debates are conducted in accordance with principles of rational discourse; 'democratic' in the sense that everyone concerned is able to participate on equal terms. Far from promoting some partisan or doctrinaire image of the good society, emancipatory action research simply seeks to create and nurture the kind of democratic culture which fosters the processes of deliberative reasoning necessary for practitioners to collectively and self-consciously participate in the processes of contestation through which their society – including its system of education – is reproduced and transformed. But as well as promoting the aims and aspirations of a 'deliberative democracy', emancipatory action research is itself embedded in, and conducted in accordance with, the democratic values and deliberative processes of the kind of 'good society' it seeks to foster and promote. As such, it is nothing other than an elaboration of the democratic form of social life of which it would itself be an integral part.

The reasons why, in *Becoming Critical*, we located this approach to action research within the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas have more recently been described by Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 9–10):

> More than any other theorist, Jürgen Habermas is responsible for reviving the idea of deliberation in our time, and giving it a more thoroughly democratic foundation. His deliberative politics is firmly grounded in the idea of popular sovereignty. The fundamental source of legitimacy is the collective judgement of the people. This is to be found not in the expression of an unmediated popular will, but in a disciplined set of practices defined by the deliberative ideal. … What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an expansive definition of who is included in the process of deliberation – an inclusive answer to the question of who has the right (and effective opportunity) to deliberate or choose the deliberators and to whom the deliberators owe their justifications. In this respect, the traditional tests of democratic inclusion, applied to deliberation itself, constitute the primary criterion of the extent to which deliberation is democratic.

In *Truth and Justification*, Habermas gave a more sustained and updated account of his view of communicative action, including the kind of communicative action we find in everyday life and in wider public spheres of argument about contemporary issues (2003: 106–7; emphases in original). He writes:

> … the rational acceptability of validity claims is ultimately based only on reasons that stand up to objections under certain exacting conditions of communication. If the process of argumentation is to live up to its meaning, communication in the form of rational discourse

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

> must, if possible, allow all relevant information and explanations to be brought up and weighed so that the stance participants take can be intrinsically motivated solely by the revisionary power of free-floating reasons. However, if this is the intuitive meaning that we associate with argumentation in general, then we also know that a practice may not seriously count as argumentation unless it meets certain pragmatic presuppositions.
>
> The four most important presuppositions are (a) publicity and inclusiveness: no one who could make a relevant contribution with regard to a controversial validity claim must be excluded; (b) equal rights to engage in communication: everyone must have the same opportunity to speak to the matter at hand; (c) exclusion of deception and illusion: participants have to mean what they say; and (d) absence of coercion: communication must be free of restrictions that prevent the better argument from being raised or from determining the outcome of the discussion. Presuppositions (a), (b) and (d) subject one's behaviour in argumentation to the rules of an egalitarian universalism. *With regard to moral-practical issues*, it follows from these rules that the interests and value-orientations of every affected person are equally taken into consideration. And since the participants in practical discourses are simultaneously the ones who are affected, presupposition (c) – which in *theoretical-empirical disputes* requires only a sincere and unconstrained weighing of the arguments – takes on the further significance that one remain critically alert to self-deception as well as hermeneutically open and sensitive to how others understand themselves and the world.

We would now wish to argue that the inclusive principle of deliberative democracy suggested by Gutmann and Thompson, and the 'exacting conditions of communication' and 'pragmatic presuppositions' argumentation outlined by Habermas are principles and presuppositions 'crucial for the conduct of' emancipatory action research. In short, emancipatory action research is a form of research that seeks to create the kind of communicative space within which practitioners can participate in making decisions, taking action and collaboratively inquiring into their own practices, their understandings of these practices, and the conditions under which they practice. Such inquiries are conducted not only as a private matter for each person involved, but also in a shared 'communicative space' (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005) – that is, a space created for communicative action (Habermas, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1996) in which co-participants consciously strive to reach intersubjective agreement, mutual understanding and unforced consensus about what, at any particular historical moment, they ought to do in order to realize the goods of their *praxis*.

But emancipatory action research is not just 'political' because of the political function of education in the process of social reproduction and transformation. It is also 'political' in the sense that the relationships between those involved and others affected are ones in which questions of morality and justice – questions of 'who gets what, when, how' – are in the forefront of participants' considerations. There is something slightly odd in this formulation, however: it suggests that there are or might be other 'non-political' views of, or approaches to, action research in which such questions are *not* in the forefront of people's considerations. For surely no one would want to defend an approach to action research in which questions of morality and justice were set aside. It is difficult to imagine that even a very pressing technical concern about how things might be done better than they are now, or about overcoming a current crisis or obstacle, could justify *not* attending to questions of morality and justice.

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

Describing only *some* kinds of action research as 'political' in the sense in which we understand action research to be political seems to imply, however, that other kinds of action research can legitimately proceed without being 'political' in this sense. We are at a loss to understand how this can be so without profound contradiction – that is, without risking being morally *unjustifiable* and thus, in principle, not an appropriate activity in which people should be involved.

EDUCATIONAL ACTION RESEARCH: 'PERSONAL', 'PROFESSIONAL' OR 'POLITICAL'?

In the foregoing sections, we have argued that education is indissolubly connected to notions of the good society; that educational action must therefore be political action aimed at realizing the tacit commitments of educational practitioners to ideas about how the good society is constituted; and that emancipatory action research is political because it engenders communicative spaces appropriate for a deliberative democracy. If these arguments are sound, are the distinctions between 'personal', 'professional' and 'political' forms of action research sustainable? Perhaps they are no more than distinctions between things put in the foreground and things left in the background – differences of emphasis rather than differences in kind. Might it be the case, however, that all forms of educational action research are simultaneously 'personal' *and* 'professional' *and* 'political'? Are the distinctions between action research as *either* 'personal' *or* 'professional' *or* 'political' coherent?

In our view, it is mistaken to think that action research can be other than *'personal'*. Participation in the research by those involved in the action has been a defining feature of action research for the whole of its history. In this sense, all action research is personal, and one of its fruits is always the *self-transformation* of participants through their developing understandings achieved through enquiry, investigation or research. Similarly, at least in the case of professional practitioners investigating the practices that are part of their professional conduct (their work as teachers or medical doctors, for example), action research cannot be other than *'professional'*. Forms of action research described as 'political', therefore, must always also be 'personal' and 'professional', at least insofar as they involve professional practitioners.

On this view, 'personal' action research cannot suspend the claims of 'political' or 'professional' action research (at least insofar as professional practitioners are involved); 'professional' action research cannot suspend the claims of 'personal' and 'political' action research; and 'political' action research cannot suspend the claims of 'personal' or 'professional' action research. To make any distinction between them can only mean, surely, that we are concerning ourselves *principally* with what is 'personal' or 'professional' or 'political' about them at some particular moment and for some particular reason. While of course one may speak of one topic more than another at any moment, we are not sure

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

that the distinction really stands as a distinction between *types* or even *emphases* of different kinds of action research. For surely what we are interested in is the activity and conduct of action research, or a particular action research initiative, not just a way of looking at it at any particular moment (from a 'personal' or 'professional' or 'political' perspective, perhaps). If the activity itself is conducted in a way that loses sight of any one of these different aspects or perspectives, then that action research or action research initiative must surely risk losing coherence and justification.

The interdependence of 'the personal', 'the professional' and 'the political' in action research can be illustrated by reference to Alasdair MacIntyre's (1983) seminal text *After Virtue*. The *personal* in action research points towards what he describes as *'the narrative unity of a human life'*; *the professional* in action research points towards what he describes in terms of *institutions*; and *the political* in action research points towards what he describes in terms of *traditions*. MacIntyre argues that virtue depends upon the interdependence of these elements. Moral *conduct*, particularly in the context of a professional practice like the practice of education, simultaneously depends upon:

(a) the existence of a *practitioner* devoted to caring for the goods internal to the practice (actually doing education and not indoctrination, for example); *and*
(b) the existence of the *institutions* that support education and through which education is made available (like formal and informal schools, libraries, universities, professional associations of educators and many other institutions); *and*
(c) the existence of *traditions* that make certain practices comprehensible and valuable *as* education (and not something else, like indoctrination).

Virtues, the unity of practitioners' lives, the existence of institutions, and the orienting power of traditions are mutually necessary and mutually constitutive of *educational practice*. To have lost the knowledge and the sense of this mutual necessity is to have lost a sense of education as a practice. According to MacIntyre, this loss is characteristic of our late modern, bureaucratized age. For him, as for other critics of modernity, it is precisely our lack of consciousness of this loss that constitutes the greatest threat not only to the tradition of the virtues but also to our communal forms of life. What we have 'forgotten' is not only virtue, but the shared forms of life within which virtue was and still may be possible – for example, a form of life in which the integrity of *education* as a practice would be protected from the standardized, bureaucratized, instrumentalized, de-professionalized and *de-valued* activities of much contemporary *schooling*.

Construed in this way, the conduct of educational action research presupposes the existence of educators (the 'personal' dimension) with a commitment to practising education. It presupposes the existence of institutions for the conduct of education (the 'professional' dimension) in which and about which practical problems and questions about the conduct of education arise, and in which professional educators deliberate about what to do about these problems and questions. And it presupposes the existence of traditions of education (the 'political' dimension) in which successive generations of educators, and contemporary

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

practitioners of education, reach contested and evolving understandings of what education is and how educational practice is and should be conducted under different circumstances, with different kinds and levels of learners, in different places and times. Action research ceases to be *educational* action research, however, when any of these elements is missing, because in the absence of any of these elements we are no longer concerned with the living practice of education, about which practical problems may arise. In the absence of educators, or of institutions or arrangements constructed (purportedly) for education, or of the intellectual and practical resources furnished by traditions of educational thought and practice, the particular kinds of problems that we recognize as *educational* cannot arise. Without each of these elements, moreover, problems of *educational practice* cannot and do not arise. Moreover, educational problems are practical problems and, as Gauthier (1963: 1) pithily remarks, 'practical problems are problems about what to do … their solution is only found in doing something, in action. Practical problems may be contrasted with theoretical problems, whose solution is found in knowing something'. While many different kinds of practical problems might arise in educational settings, *educational* practical problems concern what to do in the 'doing of' *education*, that is, in *educational practice*.

If *educational* action research is a form of research that is not so much 'in' and 'about' education as 'for' education, then deliberating on and responding to problems of what to do in order to make one's practice *educational* is primarily (though not solely) a matter for educators. It is a matter for each educator as a person, for educators collectively as a profession, and for the institutions established in order to care for the goods that are internal to education – namely, the development of the capacity for good in and for each person being educated, and development of the collective capacity for good in and for humankind. What this has meant in past times, and what it will mean in the future, is a contested and thus necessarily political matter. The different educational practices, institutions and traditions that have developed and evolved in education in different times and places attest to the way different settlements have been reached among the diverse groups and contending interests involved in and affected by the character, conduct and consequences of education for different people and groups.

CONCLUSION

Writing in 1974, W.J.M. MacKenzie said:

> No one studies politics, no one seeks to learn it academically, unless he or she is in some sense 'committed', and all are committed except the *ideotai* – who are not necessarily idiots, but seek another way of life, in contemplation or pure mathematics or cultivating their gardens. And the committed would say that these also are political stances … (p. 218)

Substitute 'education' for 'politics' and add that, in an educational context, being 'committed' simply means being bound by a particular view of the role of

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

education in creating the good society, and this quotation expresses our position concerning the relationship between politics and educational action research. In other words, nobody 'studies' or 'researches' education without taking some stance towards its political purpose and goals. Although some action researchers may, and frequently do, conduct their inquiries without articulating any particular political stance, this should not be taken to indicate that their inquiries are 'apolitical'. However apolitical some action researchers may believe their research to be, it always conveys a political commitment, even if this is unintended and even though it remains unacknowledged and undisclosed. Choosing between 'personal', 'professional' or 'political' approaches to educational action research is thus never simply an expression of a methodological preference. It also and always reflects a political commitment as well. To take, as we do in *Becoming Critical*, a 'critical' approach is deliberately to explore the relationships between these three faces of educational action research – relationships between individual and collective self-transformation, the transformation of the educational profession and educational institutions, and the transformation of the society in which one participates as an educator and a citizen – and to realise the fruits of these explorations in conduct directed towards the good for each person and the good for humankind.

REFERENCES

Aristotle (2003) *Ethics*, trans. [1953] J.A.K. Thompson, revised with notes and appendices [1976] H. Tredennick, with an introduction [1976, 2003] J. Barnes, and preface [2003] A.C. Grayling. London: The Folio Society.

Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) *Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research*, 2nd edn. London: Falmer.

Clausewitz, C. von (2004, originally published in German 1832) *On War*, trans. J.J. Graham, revised F.N. Maude, introduction J.W. Honig. New York: Barnes & Noble.

Feinberg, W. (1983) *Understanding Education: Towards a Reconstruction of Educational Inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gauthier, D.P. (1963) *Practical Reasoning*. London: Oxford University Press.

Gutmann, A. (1987) *Democratic Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2004) *Why Deliberative Democracy?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Habermas, J. (1984) *Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, J. (1987a) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, J. (1987b) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve lectures*, trans. F.G. Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1996) *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, trans. W. Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (2003) *Truth and Justification*, trans. Barbara Fultner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hollis, M. (1971) 'The pen and the purse', in *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 5 (2): 153–69.

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.

Kemmis, S. and McTaggart, R. (2005) 'Participatory action research: Communicative action and the public sphere', In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 559–604.

Laswell, H.D. (1936) *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: P. Smith.

MacIntyre, A. (1983) *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd edn. London: Duckworth.

MacKenzie, W.J.M. (1974) 'Political science: Between analysis and action', *New Society*, x (x): 218.

Copyright © 2009. SAGE Publications, Limited. All rights reserved.

The SAGE Handbook of Educational Action Research, edited by Susan E. Noffke, and Bridget Somekh, SAGE Publications, Limited, 2009.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unisa/detail.action?docID=743606.
Created from unisa on 2022-09-20 02:10:42.