NIST provides guidelines on engineering trustworthy (see Definition 1) and cyber-resilient (see Definition 2) systems through NIST SP 800-160 volumes 1 and 2 [RWM22, RPG+21], to be used in conjunction with

• ISO/IEC/IEEEE International Standard 15288:2015 [ISO15],
• NIST SP 800-37 [Joi18] and
• NIST SP 800-53 [Joi20].

A primary objective of NIST SP 800-160 volume 1 is to provide a basis for establishing a discipline for systems security engineering as part of systems engineering in terms of its principles, concepts, activities and tasks.

• Systems engineering is a transdisciplinary and integrative approach to enabling the successful realisation, use, and retirement of engineered systems [RWM22, Sec. 2.2].
• Systems security engineering is meant to provide complementary engineering capabilities that extend the concept of trustworthiness to deliver trustworthy systems [RWM22, p. 2].
• Without going into details, Fig. 1 captures the workflow in the prescribed Systems Security Engineering Framework [RWM22, Sec. 4].

A primary objective of NIST SP 800-160 volume 2 is to provide guidance on how to apply cyber resilience concepts, constructs and engineering practices to systems security engineering and risk management for systems (e.g., enterprise IT, industrial control systems, Internet of Things) and organisations.

Trusted Autonomy (TA) is a field of research that focuses on understanding and designing the interaction space between two entities each of which exhibits a level of autonomy [APM+16].

Type checking checks that program statements are well-formed with respect to a typing logic [vJ11, p. 1255].

For example, integers can be added and functions can be called, but integers cannot be called and functions cannot be added.

Type checking can be used to ensure programs are type-safe, meaning that at every step of the execution, all values have well-defined and appropriate types, and that there is a valid next step of execution.

First proposed by Canetti [Can01], the paradigm of universally composable security guarantees security even when a secure protocol is composed with an arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary system.

• It guarantees security even when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner.
• It is an essential property for maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as the Internet.

Ettus’s wiki for B210.

Ettus’ wiki for X300/X310

Setting up UHD through Anaconda and GNU Radio.

Verifying operation.

PySDR: A Guide to SDR and DSP using Python, set up UHD following Ch. 6 (original instructions). Note highest Python version supported is 3.9. Use conda to save trouble.

Stuck at ldconfig:

/sbin/ldconfig.real: Can't link /usr/lib/wsl/lib/libnvoptix_loader.so.1 to libnvoptix.so.1
/sbin/ldconfig.real: /usr/lib/wsl/lib/libcuda.so.1 is not a symbolic link

UHD Python API

>>> x310 = uhd.usrp.MultiUSRP("type=x300")
[INFO] [X300] X300 initialization sequence...
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "stdin", line 1, in module
  File "C:\Users\lawyw\Miniconda3\envs\gnuradio\Lib\site-packages\uhd\usrp\multi_usrp.py", line 30, in __init__
    super(MultiUSRP, self).__init__(args)
RuntimeError: RuntimeError: Expected FPGA compatibility number 39.0, but got 13.0:
The FPGA image on your device is not compatible with this host code build.
Download the appropriate FPGA images for this version of UHD.
As an Administrator, please run:

"C:\Users\lawyw\Miniconda3\envs\gnuradio\Library\bin\uhd\utils\uhd_images_downloader.py"

Then burn a new image to the on-board flash storage of your
USRP X3xx device using the image loader utility. Use this command:

"C:\Users\lawyw\Miniconda3\envs\gnuradio\Library\bin\uhd_image_loader" --args="type=x300,addr=192.168.10.2"

For more information, refer to the UHD manual:

 http://files.ettus.com/manual/page_usrp_x3x0.html#x3x0_flash